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THE HOME PORT DOCTRINE HELD APPLICABLE TO
FOREIGN AIR COMMERCE
Scandinavian Airline System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles
56 Cal. 2d 1, 363 P.2d 25 (14 Cal. Rptr. 25) (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961)
The city and county of Los Angeles assessed personal property taxes
on respondent's aircraft which were registered and based in foreign lands
and engaged solely in foreign commerce. The aircraft averaged eight round-
trips a year between Scandinavian ports and Canada. Each flight used the
Los Angeles airport as its sole United States terminus for less than 34 hours
per flight, thereafter leaving the United States. The taxable value of the
aircraft was apportioned by means of a formula based on the length of time
the aircraft were present in the country. From a judgment of the Los
Angeles County Superior Court, which allowed plaintiff-airlines a refund of
the taxes paid under protest, the city and county appealed. The California
Supreme Court affirmed,' holding the tax to be a burden upon foreign
commerce prohibited by the commerce clause of the Constitution of the
United States. The theory of the majority was based on the United States
Supreme Court's doctrine that ocean-going vessels engaged in foreign com-
merce are taxable only at their home port 2 as items of tangible personal
property. 3
The issue discussed by the California court was whether the home port
doctrine or the more recent apportionment doctrine of taxation should be
applied to foreign air carriers. While the Supreme Court has ruled on the
taxable situs of ocean-going vessels,4 inland waterway vessels,5 domestic
railroads,6 motor carriers,7 and interstate air carriers,8 there has been no
decision as to the taxable situs of foreign air carriers engaged only in foreign
commerce.
The home port doctrine was announced in Hays v. The Pacific Mail
1 Scandinavian Airline System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d
363 P.2d 25 (4-2 decision) (1961).
2 Home port has been interpreted to be the true domicile of the ship, the port
nearest its owner, or its port of registration. White's Bank v. Smith, 74 U.S. (7 Wal.)
646, 651 (1868) ; Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
3 The court also based its decision on interpretation of treaties with Scandinavian
Nations: Convention and Protocol with Sweden respecting double taxation, March 23,
1939, 54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958; Convention with Denmark respecting double taxation,
May 6, 1948, 62 Stat. 1730, T.I.A.S. No. 1854; Convention with Norway for the avoid-
ance of double taxation, June 13, 1949, 2 U.S.T. (1951) Part 2, p. 2323, T.I.A.S. No.
2357, 2 U.S.T. Part 2, p. 2353, T.I.A.S. No. 2358.
4 Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
G Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1948).
6 Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1890).
7 Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1927).
8 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
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Steamship Co.9 in 1854. This case held that a vessel engaged in interstate com-
merce, bit plying foreign waters,' 0 was taxable only at its domicile or
home port, and that such vessels did not acquire a taxable situs in other
ports which they entered only in transit. The Court stressed a lack of
jurisdiction on the part of other than domiciliary states to impose personal
property taxes, because such property did not become part of the personalty
of in-transit ports." However, it should be noted that when this case was
decided, systems of apportioned state taxation were not generally known
or practiced as they are today.'2 The fact that the vessels plied interna-
tional waters also seems to have had some significance in the decision, for
such vessels are considered within federal jurisdiction exclusively.13
The dissenters in the principal case stress the fact that the home port
doctrine has been repeatedly undercut or limited in Supreme Court decisions
subsequent to the Hays decision. 14 The dissent relies on the latest Supreme
Court decision in point, Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board.15
Braniff Airways was domiciled in Minnesota which was also its principal
place of business, but Braniff made regularly scheduled stops in Nebraska.'"
The majority of the Court held that this was enough to establish a taxable
situs for the Nebraska assessment of an apportioned personal property tax
9 Supra note 4.
10 Pacific's vessels, upon leaving New York City, stopped in Panama as well as
California.
11 In St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870), the Supreme Court
applied the theory of the Hays case to bar a personalty tax by an in-transit port where
plaintiff-corporation conducted a ferry-boat service across the Mississippi River. Thus
the early rule that interstate commerce via inland waterways was taxable only at the
home port. In 1948, in Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., supra note 5, the
Court ended the home port doctrine for this type of interstate commerce by holding it
subject to apportioned taxation.
12 State apportioned taxation of interstate commerce was not established until the
advent of nation-wide railroad systems which raised problems of how to properly tax
rolling stock which remained or passed through many states during the tax year. See,
generally, Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 6, and Union Re-
frigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 .(1905).
13 Such a theory was propounded in Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of Philadelphia,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 319 (1851), which did not explicitly deal with the home port
doctrine, but did hold that while there are, under the commerce clause, certain areas of
commerce requiring exclusive federal control, there are local areas of interstate and
foreign commerce which the states may regulate, such as harbor pilot regulations.
14 Scandinavian Airline System, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 363 P.2d 25, 46,
14 Cal. R. 25, 46 (1961).
15 Supra note 8. The dissenters also relied on the cases upholding apportioned
taxation of other forms of interstate commerce in an attempt to demonstrate the home
port doctrine bad become obsolete. See the cases cited in notes 5-8, supra. It should
be noted that in none of these cases did the Supreme Court reach the question of ap-
portioned taxation of foreign commerce, nor was the home port doctrine, as applied
to foreign commerce, overruled in any of the cases.
16 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., supra note 8, at 600. Appellant's
aircraft made eighteen stops per day in Nebraska.
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on Braniff's aircraft. Since the Court had previously ruled that interstate
commerce via railroad, inland waterway or motor carriage was subject to
apportioned taxation among the several states, it permitted the apportioned
taxation of interstate air commerce17 on the same basis.' s
The California courts have followed the rule of Braniff in two cases
prior to the principal case. In Slick Airways, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,19
a California District Court of Appeals held that a Delaware corporation's
fleet of airplanes, engaged in interstate commerce and principally located in
California, was taxable only on an apportioned basis.20 In Flying Tiger Line,
Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, ' a portion of plaintiff's fleet of aircraft
domiciled in the county had been engaged principally in foreign commerce.2
The California Supreme Court cited and followed the Braniff case, holding
that the aircraft were taxable by the county only on an apportioned basis.
The court reasoned that the Braniff and Standard Oil23 decisions prohibited
a full-value tax by the domiciliary county because the aircraft were receiv-
ing substantial benefits and protections while in foreign jurisdictions.
The majority in the instant case was concerned with multiple taxation
of foreign air carriers, holding that such taxation was a violation of the
commerce clause. The court reasoned that Braniff was not controlling be-
cause it concerned only interstate air carriers. The theory of the decision in
this respect was that Standard Oil2 4 judicially protects interstate air carriers
17 Ibid. "A closer analogy exists between planes flying interstate and boats
that ply the inland waters. We perceive no logical basis for distinguishing the consti-
tutional power to impose a tax on such aircraft from the power to impose taxes on
river boats." Again, it is significant that the Court does not extend its holding to
foreign commerce, but limits it to domestic interstate air carriage.
18 Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 12. In the land carrier
cases, because such carriers necessarily establish extended periods of physical contact
with the taxing non-domiciliary states, it was not too difficult to find that multiple tax
sites had been established. But air carriers, in the course of flying into and out of a
state, normally do not establish such clear physical contact with the non-domiciliary
jurisdictions. This is the point made in the dissent to Braniff, in contending that appor-
tioned taxation of air carriers may be an encroachment upon the commerce clause by
reason of multiple taxation.
19 140 Cal. App. 2d 311, 295 P.2d 46 (1956).
20 Ibid. The decision involved one airplane purchased by Slick which had not yet
joined its interstate fleet. The rest of the fleet was apportionately taxed, and the court
held the same basis applicable to the new airplane. No question of foreign commerce
was involved.
21 Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 323
(1958).
22 Ibid. The greater part of Flying Tiger's fleet was engaged in interstate com-
merce and had been taxed apportionately. Ten aircraft were operated under U.S.
military control, flying in airlifts from California to Japan, and full value taxes were
assessed on five of the aircraft.
23 Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 385 (1952).
24 Ibid. "The rule which permits taxation by two or more states on an apportion-
ment basis precludes taxation of all the property by the state of domicile."
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from multiple taxation but could not similarly protect foreign air carriers.
The court assumed that extension of the home port doctrine to foreign-based
air carriers met the commerce clause problem of multiple taxation, but this
conclusion was not valid. The majority did not go far enough. The other
half of the commerce clause problem concerns air carriers domiciled in
the United States and flying solely in foreign commerce, e.g., California-
based airlines flying into Mexico. Allowing California to tax full value as
the home port would not meet the problem of multiple taxation as a com-
merce clause issue since Mexico is not bound, in the absence of treaty, to
refrain from taxing such air carriers. A tax which raised the threat of
multiple taxation of interstate commerce has been held to be prohibited
by the commerce clause25 on the basis that such a tax would discriminate
against interstate commerce in favor of local or intrastate commerce. The
threat of double taxation is not enough. It must be established that the
tax makes interstate commerce more expensive than intrastate commerce,
the theory being that an economic advantage to local commerce hampers
the development of a free-flowing national commerce 6 In the instant case,
since Scandinavian Airways had paid a full value tax at its home port,
upholding California's apportioned-value tax would subject it to multiple
taxation of its property. However, when the tax is considered on a com-
merce clause basis alone, there does not seem to be a commerce clause
violation because there is no discriminatory burden imposed on the airline
by the tax.
The majority opinion also stresses the issue of jurisdiction to tax
property of foreign carriers and, taken with the commerce clause question,
the court seems to have blurred the constitutional issue of due process with
commerce clause issues. Due process, in its proper perspective, relates to
the justification for taxation of a carrier's property by a non-domiciliary
jurisdiction. There must be a justification for the tax premised on the
taxing jurisdiction's police-power protections and other benefits conferred
on the carrier engaged in foreign or interstate commerce within the taxing
jurisdiction 2 7 Had the California court kept the due process issue separate
from the commerce clause question, it could have reached its decision of
invalidity of the California tax on the due process issue alone by holding
that the justification for the tax was lacking. If due process is not satisfied
in the imposition of a property tax on carriers, the tax should be held invalid
without touching upon the separate issue of a commerce clause violation.
In the instant case, the amount of police power protections2 8 afforded
25 It is now substantially agreed that prohibition of taxes raising the threat of
multiple taxation, as an undue burden of commerce, springs from the commerce clause
and the intent of the framers to have a free-flowing national commerce. J. D. Adams
Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938).
26 Ibid.
27 Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, supra note 23; Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line,
336 U.S. 169, 174 (1948); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194
(1905); Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
28 E.g., fire and police protection.
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Scandinavian Airlines was not great. The tax may have had some relation
to the benefits, opportunities or protections afforded the tax carrier, and the
need of the taxing state for additional revenue may have been genuine, but
the physical relationship between the carrier and the taxing state and the
production of revenue derived by the carrier within the state must be sub-
stantial enough to justify the tax.29 The justification should be balanced
against the activity of the carrier within the taxing state, considering time
spent in physical contact with the state, whether benefits were afforded the
carrier by the state, and possibly whether the benefits conferred on the
carrier were compensated in other ways, via payment of airport rentals and
gasoline taxes.30 What constitutes a substantial relationship justifying an
apportioned property tax has not been explicitly defined, but if due process
was satisfied in Braniff, it could well be satisfied in the instant case as well.
To reach the majority decision, the Braniff hurdle of due process must be
overcome, and the majority might have properly reasoned on such a basis
because the commerce clause and due process issues were not clearly distin-
guished in Braniff.3 '
The majority of the California court alternatively held that the tax
could be held invalid on the basis of treaties between the United States
and the Scandinavian countries regarding multiple taxation. Applicability
of these treaties to property taxation of air carriers is not clear because of
an absence of specific provisions to that effect, but the majority construed
the treaties to be applicable at least to part of Scandinavian's aircraft.
32
If the majority decision is to be maintained, a much greater reliance on
the treaties is necessary, especially if it were to be determined that due
process was satisfied. Federal uniform legislation is the proper solution to
this type of property taxation which does impose some degree of double
29 Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line, supra note 27, at 174: "So far as due
process is concerned the only question is whether the tax in practical operation has
relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing
state."
3o While no figures are available for the instant case, the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Braniff points out that where Braniff's aircraft made eighteen
five-to-twenty minute stops per day in Nebraska, it paid $22,000 for use of the airport
facilities, gasoline taxes of $14,000 and other property taxes for its equipment continuously
located In Nebraska during the tax year. Even where airport facilities are privately owned
and leased to local governments, various income and corporate taxes imposed on the
private owners result in portions of such revenue reaching the state treasury.
31 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., supra note S. The Court based
its due process decision on the amount of time Braniff spent in the state of Nebraska,
the amount of revenue derived from Nebraska operations, and presumably on unsped-
fled protections conferred on the carrier.
32 The court held that the language of the treaties precluded state property taxa-
tion of foreign carriers only for aircraft owned and registered in Sweden. The dissenting
opinion felt that judicial interpretation of the treaties did not preclude any state property
taxation of foreign carriers, showing again that the appicability of the treaties to the
case at hand was primarily a matter of judicial discretion.
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taxation.3 3 But in the absence of international treaties or federal legisla-
tion, apportionment may be the best solution the courts can adopt.
33 Congress enacted a resolution directing the Civil Aeronautics Board to develop
"the means for eliminating and avoiding, as far as practicable, multiple taxation of
persons engaged in air commerce . . . which has the effect of unduly burdening or
impeding the development of air commerce." 58 Stat. 723. The C.A.B. thereafter
recommended that Congress enact a uniform allocation formula to apportion taxes
among the states, but no legislation has yet resulted. H.R. Doc. No. 141, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess.
